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I.  INTRODUCTION 
It was not too long ago that “no taxation without representation”1 unified 
the American colonies to declare their independence from Great Britain.  A 
simple desire for a voice in government empowered the political movement 
which laid the foundation for the Democratic Republic inhabitants of the 
United States enjoy today.2  The signers of the Declaration of Independence 
pledged their lives, fortunes, and honor to a movement premised on 
representation in government.3  The importance of the right to cast a ballot has 
been increasingly recognized since the Declaration of Independence.4  
Specifically, the United States Constitution grants citizens the ability to vote 
without discrimination in four amendments but does not expressly confer a 
right to vote.5  The Fifteenth Amendment prohibits the denial of the right to 
vote on the basis of race.6  The Nineteenth Amendment grants the right to vote 
to women.7  The Twenty-Fourth Amendment prevents the use of a poll tax in 
all elections.8  Lastly, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment grants the right to vote to 
United States citizens who are at least eighteen years of age.9  While 
qualifications are generally left to individual states, Article One, Section Two of 
the Constitution mandates that the qualifications to vote in federal elections be 
the same as the requirements to vote in the largest branch of a state’s 
legislature.10 
But while our Constitution protects the ability to vote, significant legal 
protections ensuring the accuracy of a vote are lacking.  Technological 
innovations and an emphasis on efficiency in elections has only exacerbated the 
problem.  Since the passage of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) in 2002, 
every state incentivized the utilization of an electronic voting machine in its 
election process.11  In reaction to the 2000 Florida voting system debacle, 
Congress passed HAVA, allocating over three billion dollars to states for 
                                                                                                                   
 1 NCC Staff, On the Day: No taxation without representation (Oct. 7, 2016), http://constitution 
center.org/blog/250-eyars-ago-today-no-taxation-withough-representation/.  
 2 Id.  
 3 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).   
 4 Garrett Epps, Voting: Right or Privilege?, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www. 
theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/09/voting-right-or-privilege/262511/. 
 5 Id. 
 6 U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
 7 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.  
 8 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  
 9 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.  
 10 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 7.  
 11 HAVA, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 20901–20906 (2006)). 
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purchasing and implementing electronic voting machines to improve the 
electoral process.12 
In addition to allocating funding for technological improvements, HAVA 
also created an independent government agency to assist in certification and 
testing of voting systems known as the Election Assistance Commission 
(EAC).13  The EAC is further tasked with providing voluntary guidelines on 
compliance with HAVA, after consultation with various election officials and 
stakeholders across the country which implement variable (albeit legal) electoral 
policies.14  However, HAVA left the manner in which electronic voting 
machines were implemented to individual states and thus left nearly complete 
discretion to states to comply with the voluntary guidelines.15  Additionally, 
certification responsibilities are shared both by states and the federal 
government to safeguard the effective operation of these voting systems, but 
detailed results of the testing is not publicly available.16  The certification of 
these machines only mandates testing “a baseline of features, controls, and 
performance that a system should exhibit as part of an overall security strategy,” 
and many federally certified machines have later malfunctioned.17  
Thus, the EAC guidelines possess little authority in achieving the goals of 
HAVA.  Former head of the EAC appointed by President Bush, DeForest 
Soaries called “ ‘charade’ ” and “claim[ed] that he had been deceived by both 
the White House and Congress” during his tenure, stating that “this country is 
ripe for stealing elections and for fraud.”18 
Despite its drawbacks, HAVA did facilitate slight regulation.  Soon after the 
bill’s passage, the EAC in conjunction with the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology crafted standards for electronic voting machines; however, 
compliance with these standards, in addition to testing and certification of these 
machines, is conducted by private companies referred to as Independent 
Testing Authorities (ITAs).19  Furthermore, the results of the tests conducted 
                                                                                                                   
 12 Id.  
 13 United States Electronic Assistance Commission, Help America Vote Act, https://www.eac. 
gov/about_the_eac/help_america_vote_act.aspx (last visited July 1, 2017).  
 14 Id.  
 15 Id.  
 16 ERIC A. FISCHER & KEVIN J. COLEMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33190, THE DIRECT 
RECORDING ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINE (DRE) CONTROVERSY: FAQS AND MISPERCEPTIONS 4 
(2005). 
 17 Id. at 10.  
 18 Victoria Collier, How to Rig an Election: The G.O.P. Aims to Paint the Country Red, HARPER’S 
MAG. (Nov. 2012), http://harpers.org/archive/2012/11/how-to-rig-an-election/?single=1. 
 19 Brian J. Miller, The Right to Participate, the Right to Know, and Electronic Voting in Montana, 69 
MONT. L. REV. 371, 378 (2008).  
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by the ITAs are themselves proprietary, thereby protecting both the ITAs and 
the electronic voting system manufacturers under trade secret laws.20  The 
testing results, plans, reports, recommendations for security measures, and 
electronic voting system reliability are inaccessible by the public.21  If a security 
risk is discovered by the ITA relating to the vulnerability or reliability of the 
electronic voting machine, the ITA may write a report, “but only a small group 
of appointed individuals and the private vendor, not the general public, have 
access to it.22  While the private companies essentially only have the burden of 
notifying the government of any impropriety in the security measures, these 
companies do not always meet this obligation.23 
A.  INFORMATION ON ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEMS  
Beginning in the 1960s, computers and other software were first utilized in 
elections to “tabulate votes recorded on punch-card ballots.”24  Generally, 
individuals record their vote by “punching out a perforated hole with a stylus or 
pen,” and the computer ballot box tabulates the vote according to position of 
the perforated hole and total number of votes in that position.25 
As technology developed, three additional basic types of voting equipment 
developed in the United States: Optical Scan Paper Ballot Systems 
(manufactured by Diebold), Direct Recording Electronic Systems (DRE) 
(manufactured by Sequoia and ES&S), and Ballot Marking Devices and 
Systems.26  
In optical scan systems, voters record their vote for a candidate or issue by 
“filling in an oval, completing an arrow, or filling in a box.”27  Many states 
utilize a paper record feature which allows for some of the DREs to “be 
equipped with Voter Verified Paper Trail (VVPAT) printers that allow the voter 
to confirm their selections on an independent paper record before recording 
                                                                                                                   
 20 Id. at 372.  
 21 Id. at 378.  
 22 Id. at 378–79.  
 23 Id. at 379–80 (describing an experience in Indiana where ES&S installed unapproved 
software into the machines, and rather than notifying election officials, attempted to deceive the 
election officials and cover up the misfeasance by “reinstalling older, certified software ‘under the 
guise of routine maintenance’ ”).  
 24 Stephanie Philips, Commentary: The Risks of Computerized Election Fraud: When Will Congress 
Rectify a 38-Year-Old Problem?, 57 ALA. L. REV. 1123, 1124 (2006).  
 25 Id. at 1124–25. 
 26 Voting Equipment in the United States, VERIFIED VOTING FOUNDATION, https://www. 
verifiedvoting.org/resources/voting-equipment/(last visited July 1, 2017).  
 27 Id.  
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their votes into computer memory,” thereby preserving a paper trial which can 
be observed in audits in accordance with that state’s laws.28 
In 2003, leading electronic voting machine manufacturers aligned with the 
Information Technology Association of America to form the Election 
Technology Council (ETC).29  With a goal to “raise the profile” of electronic 
voting and to identify security risks and technological malfunctioning, the 
association contains three major companies: Diebold, Sequoia, and Election 
Systems and Software (ES&S).30  These companies’ products are utilized 
throughout the United States and receive much of the spotlight surrounding 
electronic voting system criticism.31  
Diebold is an optical scan voting system that records votes and tabulates 
total vote count in one unit called “The AccuVote-OS.”32  Voters use a pen 
provided by the polling station and fill in an oval for their preferred candidate.33  
If they wish to cast a write-in vote, voters must record that desire by marking an 
oval, or they must write the name of a write-in candidate.34  Upon filling out the 
ballot, the voter takes it to the Accuvote-OS and the machine will record the 
selections.  If an individual recorded too many votes in an individual contest, 
which is referred to as an “over-vote,” the machine will allow the voter to 
correct their marks.35  The only person to handle the ballot throughout this 
process is the voter.36  
Sequoia manufactures a touch screen direct-recording electronic voting 
machine known as the “Sequoia AVC Edge.”37  Voters insert a “smart-card” 
into the machine which is issued by the poll worker and activates the machine.38  
Utilizing a 15-inch LCD touchscreen to navigate the ballot and record their 
votes, voters cast their ballot on a smart-card, and the machine records votes on 
                                                                                                                   
 28 Id.  
 29 Carrie Jean Del Valle, Historical Timeline of Electronic Voting Machines and Technology, MEDIUM, 
https://medium.com/@carriedelvalle23/historical-timeline-of-electronic-voting-machines-and-te 
chnology-8a17f198f86.  
 30 Id. 
 31 Joel Roberts, Can Voting Machines Be Trusted?, CBS NEWS (Nov. 11, 2003, 3:11 PM), http:// 
www.cbsnews.com/news/can-voting-machines-be-trusted/.  
 32 Premier/Diebold (Dominion) AccuVote DS, VERIFIED VOTING FOUNDATION, https:// 
www.verifiedvoting.org/resources/voting-equipment/premier-diebold/accuvote-os/ (last visited 
July 1, 2017). 
 33 Id.  
 34 Id.  
 35 Id.  
 36 Id.  
 37 Sequoia (Dominion) AVC Edge, VERIFIED VOTING FOUNDATION, https://www.verified 
voting.org/resources/voting-equipment/sequoia/avc-edge/ (last visited July 1, 2017). 
 38 Id.  
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internal flash memory cards.39  Upon making their votes, the smart-card is 
returned to a poll worker.40  When the polls close, a poll worker transfers the 
vote tabulation information from the machine’s internal flash memory card, and 
the information is taken to a central voter tabulation facility.41  These machines 
may be activated to provide for a Voter Verified Paper Trail (VVPT) whereby 
the voter may confirm his choices by observing a paper receipt.42  
In 2007, the California Secretary of State, Debra Bowen, conducted a 
mandatory statutory review of the voting tabulation systems utilized by 
California’s polling precincts.  The study reached three critical conclusions: (1) 
the certification standards of Sequoia machines were inadequate; (2) the Sequoia 
security measures were severely inadequate and could lead to questioning of the 
integrity of the election; and (3) the Sequoia machines suffer from numerous 
programming errors which could exacerbate the security concerns of the 
machines.43  These security concerns include susceptibility to outside hacking 
whereby a motivated individual can easily circumvent the security measures and 
gain access to the machine’s network.44  
ES&S manufactures a DRE electronic voting machine similar to the Sequoia 
AVC Edge.45  Utilizing an easily accessible touch screen interface and recording 
votes on an internal flash memory card, the ES&S “iVotronic” voting machine 
works similarly to a modern ATM whereby the voter manually selects their 
choices after the machine has been activated remotely from a supervisor 
terminal, known as the Personal Electronic Ballot (PEB), by a poll worker.46   
Like the Sequoia AVC Edge, the iVotronic allows the option for VVPT 
pending whether the State has implemented such auditing procedures, but that 
choice is entirely deferential to the state legislature and will not be possible 
unless that feature has been requested and installed.47  Unlike the Sequoia AVC 
Edge, which prints voter results after they have completed the entire process, 
                                                                                                                   
 39 Id.  
 40 Id.  
 41 Id.  
 42 Id.  
 43 State of California Secretary of State, WITHDRAWAL OF APPROVAL OF SEQUOIA VOTING 
SYSTEMS, INC., WINEDS V 3.1.012/AVC EDGE/INSIGHT/OPTECH 400-C DRE & OPTICAL SCAN 
VOTING SYSTEM AND CONDITIONAL RE-APPROVAL OF USE OF SEQUOIA VOTING SYSTEMS, INC., 
WINEDS V 3.1.012/AVC EDGE/INSIGHT/OPTECH 400-C DRE & OPTICAL SCAN VOTING 
SYSTEM 2–5 (Oct. 25, 2007).   
 44 Id. at 4.  
 45 Electronic Systems and Software (ES&S) iVotronics, VERIFIED VOTING FOUNDATION, 
https://www.verifiedvoting.org/resources/voting-equipment/ess/ivotronic/. 
 46 Id.  
 47 Id.  
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the iVotronic records each change the voter records, printing simultaneously that 
choice on a paper receipt that the voter can observe.48  However, the security 
concerns of the iVotronic are especially compelling.  Researchers recently 
discovered that the iVotronic had substantial vulnerabilities with one of its front 
magnetically-switched bidirectional infrared (IrDA) ports on the front of the 
machine and the memory devices utilized to access the machine.49  Using that 
port and a PDA with a downloaded “PEB emulator,” an individual could 
acquire access with ease.50  Consequently, a voter who simply brings a magnet 
and a PDA could conceivably gain access to the machine’s internal mechanisms 
or the poll supervisor’s PEB and thereby obtain sensitive voter information and 
the opportunity to manipulate vote tabulation results.51 
Electronic voting systems have been received with variable criticisms, while 
proponents argue that the machinery is incredibly secure, reliable, and flexible 
to the needs of an individual voter.52  This Note will argue, however, electronic 
voting systems, as regulated today, give too much power over public elections 
to their private manufacturers.53  Additionally, electronic voting machines such 
as DREs are susceptible to outside hacking and do not allow for reliable 
verification of votes.54  Before passing HAVA, members of Congress attempted 
to pass amendments to the Act to ensure there were paper trails in case of 
technological failure, but neither passed.55 
This Note will explore specific electoral events in places like Georgia with 
scattered reports throughout polling precincts in rural counties that the 
machines were “flipping” the vote to a different candidate in 2016, regardless of 
                                                                                                                   
 48 Id.  
 49 Kim Zetter, Report: Magnet and PDA Sufficient To Change Votes on Voting Machine, WIRED (Dec. 
17, 2007, 8:36 PM), https://www.wired.com/2007/12/report-magnet-a/.  
 50 Id.; see Fig. 7.1.  
 51 Zetter, supra note 49; see Fig. 7.1.  
 52 Do Electronic Voting Machines Improve the Voting Process?, http://votingmachines.procon.org/ 
view.answers.php?questionID=001290 (last updated Jan. 27, 2017, 10:28 AM). 
 53 Id.  
 54 Id.  
 55 Brenda Reddix-Smalls, Individual Liberties and Intellectual Property Protection – Proprietary Software 
in Digital Electronic Voting Machines: The Clash Between a Private Right and a Public Good in an 
Oligopolistic Market, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 689, 702–03 (2009) (citing S. 
1487, 110th Cong. (2007) (“Senate bill ‘[t]o amend the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to require 
an individual, durable, voter-verified paper record under title III of such Act.’ ”)); H.R. REP. NO. 
110-154, at 2 (2007) (“House Report accompanying ‘[a] bill to amend the Help America Vote Act 
of 2002 to require a voter-verified permanent paper ballot under title III of such Act, and for 
other purposes.’ ”).  
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the voter’s selection.56  Officials eventually concluded that the malfunctioning 
of the Bryan County machine occurred because “the county did not properly 
conduct logic and testing on [the machine]” to confirm that it would accurately 
capture a voter’s choice.57  
But the solution to resolving these deficiencies with electronic voting 
machines are complex. Trade secret law prevents electronic voting system 
manufacturers from divulging information on the proprietary software within 
these machines as long as certain requirements are met.  While this does not 
prevent independent discovery of the software by a member of the public, this 
Note will elaborate on the substantial power these companies possess in 
dictating the outcome of the electoral process.  Specifically, according to the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), as a member of the 
World Trade Organization, the United States must provide trade secret 
protection for companies that qualify.58  
This Note explores electoral fraud history, statutory law, case law, and 
current issues painting doubt on the accuracy of the modern electoral system.  
Part II will discuss the specific instances of ballot fraud, HAVA’s role in 
shaping the electronic voting system landscape, specific instances of critical 
electronic voting machine malfunctioning in elections, the public’s response to 
these events, and recent events during the 2016 Presidential cycle.  
Part III will discuss previously introduced solutions which, whether 
theoretical or actually implemented, fail to resolve the larger problem.  This 
Note will then use specific examples from other areas of law to advocate the 
adoption of burden-shifting which will provide increased access to the 
electronic voting machines while simultaneously preserving the protection of a 
manufacturer’s proprietary voting software under the UTSA.  Part III will 
introduce burden-shifting’s application to cases involving electronic voting 
systems and discuss Dr. Stein’s efforts in Michigan and Pennsylvania during the 
2016 presidential cycle.  Part III will then make the argument for shifting the 
burden of proof.  In Part IV, this Note will conclude that by shifting the burden 
of proof to the defendant after the plaintiff has made a sufficient evidentiary 
showing, courts can guarantee the accuracy of an election, and individuals will 
have the novel opportunity to hold electronic voting machine companies 
accountable for the malfunctioning of their machines.  
                                                                                                                   
 56 Kristina Torres, Georgia Voting Machine Suspected of ‘Flipping’ Presidential Votes, ATL-J. CONST. 
(Oct. 27, 2016), http://www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-govt--politics/georgia-voting-machin 
e-suspected-flipping-presidential-votes/woKEUgpDDEyaw9o4J318XJ/.  
 57 Id.  
 58 Trade Secret Policy, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto. 
gov/patents-getting-started/international-protection/trade-secret-policy (last visited July 1, 2017).  
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B.  TRADE SECRETS APPLICATION 
While these machines undoubtedly provide efficient returns on voting 
information and ease in calculating the percentage of votes cast for candidates 
and referendums, the technology still remains imperfect and prone to 
malfunctioning.  Furthermore, the machines are manufactured by a small yet 
powerful number of manufacturers.59  The solution seems simple: open the 
machine, test its software, and ensure that it did not malfunction.  However, 
because of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) adopted by forty-eight 
states, this solution is not feasible.60  Section 1.4 of the UTSA ensures that 
manufacturers do not willingly have to provide information about their 
software in these machines, thereby preventing an audit of their results.61  
Specifically, because the software is “not being generally known to and not 
being readily ascertainable by proper means,” it represents economic value to 
the manufacturers and thereby is protected under the UTSA.62  The most 
compelling reason manufacturers have for prohibiting inspection of these 
machines is that by placing their software into the public, the manufacturers 
lose the protections under the UTSA.63  In sum, proprietary information 
protected under trade secret law is premised on three characteristics: “(1) not 
generally known to the public; (2) confers economic benefit to the company 
specifically because it is not generally known how” to manufacture the product; 
and (3) reasonable efforts may be used to maintain secrecy.64 
Trade secret law’s rationale is based on the notion that inventors and 
scientists will be more likely to pour significant resources and time into the 
development of their products if it is guaranteed that they will retain the 
economic value derived from its creation.65  The law’s vague, ambiguous nature 
allows the protections to apply to variable products within the intellectual 
property realm—essentially any discrete knowledge or information may be 
claimed to be a trade secret.66  While the trade secret protection does not 
                                                                                                                   
 59 Roberts, supra note 31.   
 60 Unif. Trade Secrets Act (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, as amended 
1985).   
 61 Id. § 1.4. 
 62 Id. § 1.4(i). 
 63 Id. (see Comment to § 1).  
 64 Paul Holly, Trade Secrets and Election Companies: Private Companies in Government Elections, 
IPWATCHDOG (Nov. 3, 2013), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/11/03/trade-secrets-and-elec 
tion-companies-the-use-of-equipment-manufactured-by-private-companies-in-government-electi 
ons/id=46002/. 
 65 Id.  
 66 Id.  
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prevent inventors from independently discovering a means to reproduce 
something protected under trade secret law, individuals and entities relying on 
trade secret law to protect their proprietary information enjoy the protection 
indefinitely—there is no temporal limit to its duration.67  
In 1996, Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act to allow public 
access to government information.68  Ensuring public trust in government was 
seemingly vital to Congress, but ensuring the integrity of elections was not a 
priority.  Thus, the act contains exceptions for trade secrets to protect sensitive 
public and private information and interests.69  Furthermore, disclosing 
information to the government, such as information surrounding the source 
code of the electronic voting machine, does not vitiate the trade secret 
protections; specifically, the fourth exception to the Freedom of Information 
Act allows “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained 
from a person and privileged or confidential” to be exempt from public 
disclosure requests.70 
Proponents of amending the trade secret laws to allow access to the 
machines and disclosure of the software within should not expect to celebrate 
anytime soon.  Congressman Hank Johnson of Georgia’s fourth district recently 
displayed the bipartisan efforts to protect and bolster federal trade secret law by 
recently introducing the VOTE Act of 2016 “to amend the Help America Vote 
Act of 2002 to make improvements to voting system technology, election 
official training, and protecting voting system source code.”71  While the bill did not 
pass during the 114th Congress, the gesture is symbolic of the struggle electoral 
system reformers endure when attempting to hold the manufacturers 
accountable in the public domain.  
Additionally, in May 2016, President Barack Obama signed the Defend 
Trade Secrets Act of 2016 into law, making the bill “the most significant trade 
secret reform in almost two decades.”72 Receiving overwhelming bipartisan 
support in both the House and the Senate, only two elected officials voted 
                                                                                                                   
 67 Id.  
 68 Id.  
 69 Id.  
 70 Id. (citing the UTSA).  
 71 VOTE Act of 2016, H.R. 5131, 114th Cong. (2016) (emphasis added).  However, there have 
been bills introduced to require States to implement paper trails and other audit features which 
have received substantial support regardless of party; see generally The Voter Confidence and 
Increased Accessibility Act of 2005, H.R. 550, 109th Cong. (2005).  
 72 Ehab Samuel, What The Defend Trade Secrets Act Means for Businesses, LAW 360 (May 11, 2016), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/791617/what-the-defend-trade-secrets-act-means-for-businesses. 
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against the bill.73  Rather than preempting the variable trade secret laws amongst 
states which primarily follow the UTSA, The Defend Trade Secrets Act 
essentially creates a federal civil cause of action for the theft of trade secrets and 
adds additional layers of federal protection for individuals seeking to protect 
their works under trade secrets laws.74  Therefore, the solution to potential 
electronic voting machine malfunctioning is unlikely to be resolved by 
Congress.  Rather, their willful ignorance of a widely recognized electoral issue 
exacerbates the already prevalent problems with holding electronic voting 
system manufacturers accountable.  
C. PRESENT RELEVANCE  
Concerns with the integrity, accuracy, and security of the various electronic 
voting machines have been exacerbated by recent events in the 2016 
presidential election cycle, namely the outside-hackings of the Democratic 
National Committee (DNC), Republican National Committee (RNC), and 
Russia’s alleged attempts to intervene in the election cycle.  These concerns are 
exacerbated when reports surfaced that “[n]early half of the states in the U.S. 
have recently had their voter registration systems targeted by foreign hackers, 
and four of those systems have successfully been breached.”75  In an interview 
with NPR, President Obama promised to take action against Russia for their 
attempts to influence the 2016 presidential election.76  Meanwhile President 
Trump unequivocally has voiced his discontent with the accuracy of the 
intelligence reports, believing that the same individuals within the CIA are 
attempting to “delegitimize” his presidency.77  However, despite his reasons for 
withholding approval of the intelligence reports, President Trump repeatedly 
called the 2016 general election “rigged,” casting considerable concern over the 
legitimacy of what has been perceived as the most unique presidential election 
                                                                                                                   
 73 Id. (stating that the vote in the House voting for the Bill was 410–2, and the vote in the 
Senate was 87–0).  
 74 Id.  
 75 Mike Levine & Pierre Thomas, Russian Hackers Targeted Nearly Half of States’ Voter Registration 
Systems, Successfully Infiltrated 4, ABC NEWS (Sept. 29, 2016), http://abcnews.go.com/US/russian-
hackers-targeted-half-states-voter-registration-systems/story?id=42435822. 
 76 Julie Hirschfeld Davis & David E. Sanger, Obama Says U.S. Will Retaliate for Russia’s Election 
Meddling, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/15/us/politics/russi 
a-hack-election-trump-obama.html. 
 77 Id.  
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in recent memory.78  Those claims of “rigging” by Trump’s campaign prompted 
the Carter Center, a renowned not-for-profit, nongovernmental agency that has 
observed over 100 foreign elections and assisted in implementing democratic 
principles, to release a statement and condemn those claims as “unfounded and 
irresponsible.”79  Further analysis of recent events after the 2016 presidential 
election, including actions by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) will be discussed at a later point. 
The problems inherent with voting machines have not gone unnoticed by 
the popular electorate in Georgia.  In October 2016, two polls conducted by the 
Atlanta Journal Constitution portrayed not only the historical importance of the 
2016 election but also the negative attitudes voters have toward electronic 
voting systems.80  In a sample size of 1,157 Georgians who were asked a 
multitude of questions via telephone, 82% of respondents noted that this 
election “matters a great deal” to the country’s future, and a plurality of voters 
likewise expressed concern with whether their vote will be accurately counted 
this year.81  Specifically, only 45% of respondents were very confident, with 
33% somewhat confident, 13% not too confident, and 7% not confident at 
all.82  These statistics show that a majority of voters (52%) lack a baseline level 
of confidence in the current accuracy of the 2016 presidential election.83  
II.  BACKGROUND 
Voting: integral, sacred, and a requisite premise of a democratic republic.  
Ensuring that one’s voice is actually being registered is a foundational element 
of a true democratic republic.  Without a complete guarantee that votes are 
accurately counted, representative government becomes a façade, and 
accountability becomes an unattainable aim.  Yet voting fraud is not a novel 
dilemma.  In 1932, Huey Long successfully ensured the passage of amendments 
to the Louisiana Constitution that would further his financial interests.84  While 
                                                                                                                   
 78 Jonathan Martin & Alexander Burns, Officials Fight Donald Trump’s Claims of a Rigged Vote, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/17/us/politics/donald-trump-
election-rigging.html. 
 79 Press Release, Carter Center, Carter Center Statement on the Integrity of U.S. Elections 
(Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/us-elections-101916.html.  
 80 Abt SRBI, Poll of Georgia Voters, October 2016, ATL.-J. CONST., http://www.myajc.com/octob 
er-2016-poll/ (last visited July 1, 2017).  
 81 Id.  
 82 Id.  
 83 Id.  
 84 Victoria Collier, How to Rig an Election, HARPERS MAG. (Nov. 2012), http://harpers.org/archi 
ve/2012/11/how-to-rig-an-election/1/.   
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acting as Governor of Louisiana, Long was unafraid to threaten and intimidate 
state legislators with diminished funding to their parishes if his policy objectives 
were not passed.85  Long was eventually caught, and 513 election officials were 
indicted.86  However, he utilized the Louisiana legislature to modify “the state’s 
election law, giving ex post facto protection to the [election officials].”87 
Fast-forward sixteen years.  Then-Congressman Lyndon Johnson faced a 
difficult primary opponent to the United States Senate.88  Three significant 
events occurred in this race.  In the initial primary, neither candidate was able to 
reach the requisite majority of votes to be elected; however, in the subsequent 
primary-runoff, Johnson was reportedly trailing by 20,000 votes with only a few 
districts left uncounted.89  One district, San Antonio, had overwhelmingly voted 
for his opponent in the initial primary by a ratio of 2:1; yet, Johnson carried San 
Antonio by over 10,000 votes that night.90  Furthermore, rural counties in the 
Rio Grande Valley heavily voted for Johnson, diminishing his opponent’s lead 
to a seemingly close margin victory of 854 votes.91  However, the next day, 
election officials “discovered” a new and uncounted precinct.92  To complicate 
matters further, the Rio Grande Valley districts not only returned more ballots, 
they then corrected those returns, adequately ensuring Johnson received enough 
votes to be elected.93  
A.  THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION  
One of the most significant events questioning election integrity occurred 
during the 2000 presidential election in Florida.94  The lack of sound, uniform 
election procedures across Florida contributed significantly to the election day 
debacle.95  Individuals were regularly denied access to the polls throughout the 
state, ranging from misidentification issues labeling potential voters as “felons” 
                                                                                                                   
 85 Id.  
 86 Id.  
 87 Id.  
 88 Martin Tolchin, How Johnson Won Election He’d Lost, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 1990), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/1990/02/11/us/how-johnson-won-election-he-d-lost.html.  
 89 Id.  
 90 Id.   
 91 Id.  
 92 Id.  
 93 Id.  
 94 Philips, supra note 24, at 1125.  
 95 Rights Commission’s Report on Florida Election, WASH. POST (June 5, 2001), http://www.wash 
ingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/transcripts/ccrdraft060401.htm.   
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to the lack of compliance of many absentee ballots with Florida law.96  
Consequently, the Commission on Civil Rights found that Florida experienced a 
large “undervote”—the ballots were cast but the technology in the voting 
machine failed to register the votes.97 The ballots that failed to register 
contained “hanging chads,” meaning many of the ballots did not have 
completely punched holes for specific candidates.98 
The Commission also discovered that the governor and secretary of state 
ignored mounting evidence and repeated pleas by state election officials for a 
potential malfunction of their electronic voting systems.99  Further evidence, as 
reported by the Commission, demonstrated that African Americans were the 
most severely affected group.  While accounting for 11% of the total voting-age 
population in Florida, the Commission found that 54% of African American 
voters were denied the ability to vote.100  Specifically, the Commission 
determined the most dramatic undercount in the election was the nonexistent 
ballots of the countless unknown eligible voters, who were wrongfully purged 
from the voter registration polls.101  
The presidential election of 2000 exhibits the potential implications for 
refusing to address a real problem that may not only be affecting the accuracy 
of a vote, but also potentially diminishes the influence of minority groups in the 
election process.   
B.  THE 2002 AND 2006 ELECTIONS 
“DRE systems experienced a number of problems already in the 
2002 elections, and we see this only as the tip of the iceberg.”102 
Despite existing since the 1970s, Direct Record Electronic Voting systems 
have been increasingly utilized to combat the problems that arose with ballot-
voting in the 2000 presidential election.  In 2002, in response to the debacle that 
                                                                                                                   
 96 David Barstow & Don Van Natta Jr., Examining the Vote: How Bush Took Florida: Mining the 
Overseas Absentee Vote, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/15/us/ex 
amining-the-vote-how-bush-took-florida-mining-the-overseas-absentee-vote.html?_r=0.  
 97 See supra note 95.  
 98 Ari Berman, How the 2000 Election in Florida Led to a New Wave of Voter Disenfranchisement, THE 
NATION (July 28, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/how-the-2000-election-in-florida-le 
d-to-a-new-wave-of-voter-disenfranchisement/.  
 99 Id.  
 100 Id.  
 101 Id.  
 102 Verified Voting Foundation, http://votingmachines.procon.org/view.source.php?sourceID 
=000961 (last visited July 1, 2017).  
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occurred in the 2000 presidential election, Congress passed the aforementioned 
HAVA, funneling over three billion dollars to incentivize states to upgrade their 
voting technology by utilizing electronic voting machines.103  These systems 
were in effect in Florida’s 13th Congressional District during the 2006 election 
cycle.104  Ironically enough, Kathrine Harris, the former Secretary of State for 
Florida during the 2000 presidential election, decided to leave her seat, and a 
hard-fought and tight race ensued between Democrat Christine Jennings and 
Republican Vernon Buchanan.105  On the night of the election, Buchanan won 
by a slim margin of less than 400 votes.106  However, election officials soon 
discovered that 18,000 voters had seemingly not voted in that specific 
congressional race in the 13th District despite voting for candidates running for 
the United States Senate.107  The large undervote occurred despite election 
officials receiving advanced reports during early voting that the electronic 
voting systems were regularly failing to register ballots properly in the 
congressional race.108  Overall, the undervoting figure accounted for 
approximately 13% of individuals who voted on Election Day and 17% of 
individuals who took part in early voting.109  
The 13th Congressional District utilized an ES&S (DRE) voting system.110  
Manufacturers of this system, perhaps in their effort to safeguard their own 
credibility and legitimacy, inserted software which forced a voter to verify all of 
their votes at the end in a type of “summary” page, including the display of “no 
selection made” in red letters if the voter failed to vote for a contest.111  But this 
was not a VVPT—a voter could navigate away from the “warning screen” by 
simply, either knowingly or unintentionally, confirming their options.112 
Florida election officials had been made aware of the issues with the 
machines from ES&S, identifying problems with delayed responses which 
varied across each terminal and could not be remedied without a software 
update—an update promised but which never occurred before the 2006 
                                                                                                                   
 103 Reddix-Smalls, supra note 55, at 702.  
 104 Jessica Amunson & Sam Hirsch, The Case of the Disappearing Votes: Lessons from the Jennings v. 
Buchanan Congressional Election Contest, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 397, 400–07 (2008).  
 105 Id.  
 106 Id. at 398. 
 107 Id. at 398–99.  
 108 Id. at 399; see Todd Ruger, Voting Glitch Prompts Warning, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., Nov. 5, 
2006, at B1.  
 109 Id.  
 110 Id. at 400. 
 111 Id. at 107. 
 112 Id. at 401. 
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November general election.113  Jennings filed suit in Florida and moved for the 
Circuit Court to allow him to access the ES&S source code, which would allow 
experts to examine the software and determine if any malfunctioning 
occurred.114  However, Florida’s evidence code provided for “a trade-secret 
privilege.”115  Under this law, “a person has the privilege to refuse to disclose, 
and to prevent other persons from disclosing, a trade secret owned by that 
person if the allowance of the privilege will not conceal fraud or otherwise work 
injustice.”116  Claiming this protection was unprecedented, and in a trade secrets 
dispute, the plaintiff must have a “reasonable necessity for the requested 
materials.”117  ES&S had the burden to show “good cause for protecting or 
limiting discovery by demonstrating that . . . disclosure may be harmful.”118 
Following an evidentiary hearing on the determination of Jennings’ “reasonable 
necessity” for discovery, the Circuit Court Judge denied access to the ES&S 
software, reasoning that it would “result in destroying or at least gutting the 
protections afforded those who own the trade secrets.”119 
Despite the general consensus amongst experts, researchers, and academics 
in the political science field that if the votes had been accurately counted 
Jennings would have won by 3,000 votes, Jennings was unable to legally compel 
discovery of the ES&S Software.120  As two commentators noted, Judge Gary 
essentially concluded that the public’s right to know what happened in the 
election was subordinate to ES&S’s trade secret privilege.121  Despite Florida 
law requiring a manual recount because Buchanan won by less than 1%, there 
was no “paper trail” incorporated into the electoral practice in that district; thus, 
if Jennings was unable to prove malfunctioning because of the trade-secret 
privilege granted to ES&S, she was left without a remedy to prove machine 
error.122  The practical effect left voters in Florida’s 13th Congressional District 
contemplating whether the correct individual was representing their interests in 
the House of Representatives.   
                                                                                                                   
 113 Id.  
 114 Id. at 405–06.  
 115 Id. at 407. 
 116 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.506 (2006).  
 117 Sheridan Healthcorp, Inc. v. Total Health Choice, Inc., 770 So. 2d 221, 222 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2000).  
 118 Am. Express Travel Related Servs., Inc. v. Cruz, 761 So. 2d 1206, 1209 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2000).  
 119 Amunson & Hirsch, supra note 104, at 410 (citing Order on Motions at 3, Jennings, No. 
2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL 4404531).  
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In 2002, Georgia and Alabama also allegedly experienced reliability issues 
with their electronic voting machines.  In Georgia, both three-time incumbent 
State Senator Max Cleland and Governor Roy Barnes were defeated in their bid 
for re-election.123  Georgia utilized the Diebold voting machines.124  The 
outcome was unexpected, and a whistle-blower conceded that the machines had 
recently received undisclosed software patches.125  However, they were installed 
incredibly late in the process and did not abide by Georgia law that required 
these patches be certified by the state.126  
Because of much criticism revolving around its voting machines used in 
elections such as 2000 Presidential Election and 2002 Georgia Gubernatorial and 
Senate Races, Diebold initially attempted to retain its reputation by creating a 
subsidiary “Premier” for election products.127  However, it then distanced itself 
from being in the electoral field, and recently sold its subsidiary.128  But the lesson 
from Georgia is clear and only advances proponents’ remedies: scrutinize all the 
software and, at bare minimum, have a contingency plan in place.129  
Similar to the experiences of both Governor Barnes and Senator Cleland, 
Governor Don Siegelman (D) believed he had won re-election in the 2002 
Alabama gubernatorial race.  However, Baldwin County, a primarily republican 
district, reported that a glitch had given 6,000 additional votes to Siegelman.130  
Additionally, evidence existed that the machine might have been hacked and 
tampered with to skew the results.131 
According to a 2005 Congressional report, this computerized method of 
voting is now the most popular voting method in the United States.132  While 
the report determined that the DREs did not pose a significant threat to 
electoral legitimacy at the time, the authors explicitly stated concerns about “the 
                                                                                                                   
 123 Adam Cohen, A Tale of Three (Electronic Voting) Elections, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2008), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2008/07/31/opinion/31observer.html. 
 124 Id.; see also Diebold Voting Machine President Personally Delivered a Secret, Illegal Software Update, 
NATIONAL ELECTION DEFENSE COALITION, https://www.electiondefense.org/georgia-2002-1/ 
(last visited July 1, 2017).  
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lack of information about DRE security, especially in relation to other systems 
and other components of election integrity.”133  
C.  COMMUNITY ACTIVISM  
In 2006, Mr. David Mills, an attorney and registered voter in Shelby County, 
Tennessee, challenged the constitutionality of electronic voting machines under 
both the Tennessee Constitution and United States Constitution.134  Shelby 
County required its citizens to vote on electronic voting machines which did 
not produce a VVPT or any similar record of the vote that individual casted.135  
In addition, if a discrepancy occurred and a voter wished to verify the candidate 
they voted for, poll workers had no ability “to review a questionable vote and 
determine the intent of the voter.”136  Mr. Mills’ primary concern with 
electronic voting machines revolved around verifiable data surrounding the 
election that would be able to be accessed in the case of a recount, but because 
Tennessee didn’t mandate VVPT, his vote was diminished in comparison to 
other counties that provided paper ballots.137  The Court failed to agree, holding 
that there was insufficient evidence that the electronic voting machines utilized 
in Shelby County were disenfranchising voters.138  The Court allowed the 
continued use of the electronic voting machines because of the deference 
provided to legislatures in creating election systems.139  In addition, because the 
voter has no right to a “perfect voting system” and adequate safeguards exist to 
guard against malfunction, the electronic voting systems in place are sufficient 
mediums for recording and tabulating votes.140 
Furthermore, in 2006, Maryland Governor Robert Ehrlich, a long-time 
supporter of the Diebold electronic voting machines used in his state, called for 
a paper ballot requirement.141  Other states such as Georgia and Florida are 
considering sweeping changes to the way their machines are utilized and 
regulated.142 
                                                                                                                   
 133 Id.   
 134 Mills v. Shelby Cnty. Election Comm’n, 218 S.W.3d 33, 34 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).  
 135 Id. at 35.  
 136 Id.  
 137 Id. at 40.  
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Unsurprisingly, Hollywood did not miss the opportunity to dramatize public 
concern with the vote integrity throughout the early 2000s.  Two significant 
movies, Recount (2008) and Man of the Year (2006), depicted the harsh reality 
of the reliability of unregulated electronic voting systems.  Produced by HBO, 
Recount is a dramatized account of Bush v. Gore and dives into the key criticisms 
of the election: hanging chads, differing electoral policies, and partisan biases.  
Kevin Spacey plays Ron Klain, a key democratic strategist and trusted advisor 
to Democratic Presidential Candidate Al Gore.  The movie portrays a legal 
sparring match between James Baker, played by Tom Wilkinson, and Kevin 
Spacey’s Ron Klain and highlights critical moments of the campaign, including 
the moment the Supreme Court ruled against Gore.143 
In Man of the Year (2006), Robin Williams plays a comedian who is convinced 
to run for president and surprisingly wins—but only because the fictional 
electronic voting machine company, Delacroy, manipulated the results to ensure 
his victory.144  To many there was little doubt that “Delacroy” symbolized the 
election disasters “Diebold” experienced in the elections around that time.145  
D.  THE 2012 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION  
In 2012, electronic voting machines reportedly caused issues in 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Carolina, and Georgia.146  A video from a polling 
location in Pennsylvania showed voting machines “flipping” a vote from 
Obama to Romney.147  Machine breakdowns in Virginia caused up to five hour 
delays at the voting precincts, and South Carolina reported similar 
malfunctioning with their own electronic voting systems.148 
Despite an academic emphasis on the negligent maintenance and unreliable 
nature of these machines, the mere potential of outside hacking and 
manipulation remains possible.  In August 2016, the DHS contemplated 
whether to add the United States election system to its list of entities (such as 
                                                                                                                   
 143 See Roger Ebert, Recount, ROGER EBERT: REVIEWS (May 25, 2008), http://www.rogerebert. 
com/reviews/recount-2008.  
 144 David Weigel, The Forgettable Liberal Politics of Robin Williams, SLATE (Aug. 12, 2014, 10:56 
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the already-present power grid and financial institutions) needing protection 
from cybersecurity attacks.149  Jeh Johnson, then-Secretary of Homeland 
Security, noted that his department was “actively thinking” about the additional 
cybersecurity protections.150  
Despite the Secretary’s rhetoric about preventing outside hacking in elections, 
the DHS was recently accused of attempting to bypass Georgia’s protected 
electoral database firewall without authorization by Secretary of State of Georgia 
Brian Kemp.151  Soon thereafter, the DHS decided to classify the electoral system 
as “critical infrastructure.”152  Despite DHS rightly acting to protect the integrity 
of elections, it was already too late to enact adequate safeguards and protections 
in the 2016 election cycle.  However, President Obama reiterated that there 
existed no credible evidence of outside vote tampering.153  
Yet the potential ease in tampering with these machines is incredibly 
concerning.  In 2007, a group of researchers at Princeton University hacked into 
a Diebold electronic voting machine and successfully changed the voting results 
by inserting certain software into the voting machine.154  One year later, the 
same researchers only took seven minutes to install a computer program in an 
electronic voting machine “that steals votes from one party’s candidates, and 
gives them to another.”155  That machine that was hacked was manufactured by 
Sequoia Advantage.156 Presently, according to Roger Johnson, head of the 
vulnerability assessment team at Argonne National Laboratory, the Sequoia 
Advantage machine is used “in at least six states by 9 million voters,” and the 
Diebold machine are “used in at least 20 states by 21 million voters.”157 
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E.  THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND ITS AFTERMATH  
In November 2016 Donald Trump defeated Hillary Clinton in a tight contest 
to become the forty-sixth President of the United States.  President Trump was 
initially declared the clear winner, but in a number of jurisdictions, various 
electronic voting systems errors consequently led to profoundly long lines.  
In Pennsylvania, four counties reported problems with a total of twenty-five 
electronic voting machines.158  Many Republicans, Democrats, and computer 
scientists concede that problems with the aging machines are common in 
Pennsylvania, but the state’s top election official, Pedro Cortes, declared that, 
regardless of the problems that occurred with the machines, “it appears that no 
votes were cast inaccurately and no voters were disenfranchised.”159  However, 
in Pennsylvania’s Butler, Lebanon, Luzerne, and Westmoreland counties, 
Republicans reported that their votes for Trump flipped to Hillary Clinton—a 
tough reality exacerbated by the notion that these counties do not utilize paper 
trails thus making it impossible to perform a post-election audit.160  Specifically, 
in Westmoreland County, GOP chairman Michael Korns stated in an interview 
“that about a dozen voting machines were taken offline because they had been 
recording votes for Clinton that had been intended for Trump.”161  
Furthermore, North Carolina experienced such widespread problems with 
their electronic voting systems that they made the decision to keep polls open in 
eight precincts in Durham County for between twenty and sixty minutes “to 
check in voters manually.”162  Specifically, election officials in Durham County 
experienced issues consisting of “software malfunctions with the laptops used 
to verify voter registration.”163  Counties were forced to switch to paper rolls, 
and at one precinct, voting stopped for two hours when the election site ran out 
of forms.164  Nearly 40% of Durham residents are African Americans—a 
county which voted overwhelmingly for President Obama in 2012.165  A similar 
experience occurred in Charlotte, where one individual attempted to vote for 
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Republican Donald Trump on his machine up to fifteen times before it finally 
registered.166  
In Washington County, Utah, election officials endured problems with 
getting the electronic voting machines operational after they failed to work 
properly when the polls opened.167  Utah Director of Elections Mark Thomas 
noted that the machines experienced programming errors.168 Overall, only 
ninety-nine out of the 380 machines allegedly had their memory cards 
programmed properly, and voters were given paper ballots instead.169  In 
Detroit, Michigan, voters were delayed when the machine which counted 
ballots malfunctioned at the beginning of Election Day.170  Voters were told to 
leave their ballots in a secure box or wait for a technician to arrive to address 
the problem.171 
Not long after confirmation of 2016 election results, Green Party Candidate 
Jill Stein launched a recount effort in Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin, 
citing critical flaws in the states’ electronic voting systems for reliability and 
accurately verifying votes.172  Dr. Stein was successful in obtaining a recount in 
Wisconsin, but President Trump remained the winner.173  Meanwhile, Michigan 
began the recount until a lower court in Michigan halted the recount, and a 
federal judge declined Stein’s request for a recount in Pennsylvania.174  
III.  ANALYSIS 
Presently, trade secret law protects electronic voting machine manufacturers 
from the forces disclosure of their proprietary information to the public, 
regardless of the likelihood that a particular machine malfunctioned.  
Consequently, the machines cannot be audited to determine their accuracy and 
reliability, thus incentivizing companies to hide their errors and mistakes, or as 
                                                                                                                   
 166 Id.  
 167 Richard Wolf & Kevin McCoy, Voters in Key States Endured Long Lines, Equipment Failures, 
USA TODAY (Nov. 9, 2016, 1:09 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/electio 
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 168 Associated Press, Malfunctioning Voting Machines Prompt Switch to Paper Ballots in Southern Utah, 
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 169 See Wolf & McCoy, supra note 167.  
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mentioned previously, to attempt to patch the software glitches without notice 
to the individual state.175 
A.  CALLS FOR REMEDIES  
Many keen observers of the electoral process have identified substantive 
errors with these machines and have called for procedural reform in the manner 
electronic voting systems are regulated and utilized.  Remedies such as paper 
auditing, changing the optics in the machines, and the creation of a federal 
election commission which produces mandatory, rather than the voluntary 
guidelines proffered by the HAVA-created EAC.176  
Another possible solution has been called the “No Government Trade 
Secrets Solution” where it is declared that a government trade secret “in any 
context is little more than a legal fiction, [and] trade secrecy theory and 
application are clarified and transparency, accountability, and deliberative 
democracy are not curtailed by trade secrecy.”177  Essentially, this remedy calls 
for vitiating electronic voting system manufacturers’ objections and mandatory 
disclosure of their proprietary software, simply because the law would eliminate 
government trade secrets.178  Proponents argue this bright-line rule, or lack 
thereof, facilitates a more transparent and accountable process.179  A voting 
system manufacturer wishing to maintain their competitive edge in the industry 
would seek protection under patent law instead, and the information filed in the 
patent would be openly disclosed to the public after eighteen months, thereby 
alleviating any concerns inherent with non-disclosure of integral election 
software.180  Yet, with the aforementioned recent support by Republicans for 
increased trade secret protections, their ability to retain control of both the 
House and the Senate, and the recent presidential election of Republican 
President Donald Trump, government trade secrets are unlikely to be 
completely nullified—even through a patent remedy.  
Commentators have likewise advocated for the use of liberal discovery.181  
For example, in Georgia, trial judges in contested-election cases have “the 
power to do everything ‘necessary and proper’ to expeditiously hear and resolve 
                                                                                                                   
 175 Amunson & Hirsch, supra note 104.  
 176 Philips, supra note 24, at 1158–60.  
 177 David S. Levine, The People’s Trade Secrets?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 61, 107 
(2011).  
 178 Id.  
 179 Id.  
 180 Id. at 108.  
 181 See Amunson & Hirsch, supra note 104, at 418.  
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the dispute, including ‘to compel the production of evidence which may be 
required at such hearing.’ ”182  Similarly, in statewide elections, Illinois provides 
plaintiffs with the ability to request the examination of “records and equipment 
under the control of an election authority.”183  However, the competing 
concern that, “[i]n some circumstances, there may be risks to the electoral 
system itself if voting-machine source code becomes widely available” will likely 
ensure that election-contest statutes are not construed liberally to include 
proprietary software under federal trade secret protections.184  Without the 
federal government’s implicit consent of vitiating some protections inherent 
with federal trade secrets, state judges are unlikely to allow liberal discovery.   
B.  THE PAPER AUDIT (VVPT) REMEDY 
A potential solution to deficiencies in the electronic voting systems could 
require Congress to mandate uniform paper auditing (i.e., VVPT), thereby 
instructing the voting machine issue the voter with a paper receipt indicating 
how each vote was cast.  However, in the absence of procedures for observing 
the open source software within the electronic voting systems, VVPTs are 
unlikely to provide little assurance to vote integrity, masking the potential future 
malfunctions in a façade of transparency. 
 Paper audits have increasingly gained traction in states that attempt to 
reform their electronic voting systems, implementing audit procedures where 
votes are hand-counted on paper records and comparing them to originally 
recorded vote counts.185  Acting largely as a prophylactic, these procedures are 
generally implemented via state legislation and require variable mandatory audits 
of a small percentage of votes cast.186  Only sixteen states do not have paper 
auditing policies in place.187  Because of the unwillingness of Congress to 
address the insufficiencies with electronic voting systems, states have widely 
implemented variable auditing policies and safeguards to preserve public 
confidence in the electoral system, whether codified by statute, existing as a 
policy or directive, as is the case in California, or providing a foundation which 
                                                                                                                   
 182 Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 21-2-525(b) (2008)).  
 183 Id. (citing 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/23-1.6a (West 2003)).  
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 186 Id.  
 187 Editorial: Electronic Voting is the Real Threat to Elections, USA TODAY (Sept. 19, 2012, 8:45 PM), 
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differs by population in each county.188  Yet, a prophylactic only masks the 
potential software issues within these machines, and if doubts remain to both 
the integrity of these electronic voting machine manufacturers and their 
machines, a VVPT installed by these manufacturers provides little assurance of 
accuracy and reliability in one’s vote.  
During the 2016 legislative session, the North Carolina General Assembly 
passed HB 836 which defines a ballot “as a paper document marked by a voter 
either by hand or electronically,” meaning that the over 300 iVotronic machines 
currently in use in Brunswick and Pender Counties will be non-compliant 
because the machines do not produce a ballot.189  
Another swing state, Virginia, does not implement any auditing 
procedures.190  Florida, while implementing an auditing procedure in 2007, 
audits only one randomly selected election contest which is selected separately 
in each county.191  Pennsylvania instituted an audit requirement for 2% of the 
votes cast or 2000 votes, whichever is the lesser.192  In addition, California, 
whose statutes and policies often blaze a trail and provide a sound model, only 
requires a hand count of ballots of 1% of precincts in each jurisdiction.193  
Meanwhile, in Connecticut, the General Assembly codified mandatory use of 
paper ballots and manual audits.194  During each election, 10% of voting 
districts in Connecticut are randomly selected, and state officials conduct a hand 
count of the ballots.195 
Imagine a grocery store in the early morning.  Joe is standing in line, waiting 
patiently for the teenager at the cash register to slowly finish with the elderly 
lady in front of him.  Joe’s responsibilities and obligations begin to race through 
his mind, and he realizes he is going to be late for work.  He still needs to fill up 
on gas, grab breakfast for the family, and take the dog outside.  But finally, it is 
his turn.  He hurriedly loads the items on the conveyor belt, pays for his 
purchase, takes his receipt, and rushes out the store.  
                                                                                                                   
 188 Id.  
 189 Adam Wagner, 2015 Legislation in North Carolina Bans Strictly Electronic Voting Machine, 
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Now imagine that grocery store is a voting precinct, and the cashier is a 
volunteer election official.  Arguably, the precinct also retains a copy of the 
receipt and has the ability to verify votes.  The problem with VVPTs is 
axiomatic—a collective electorate cannot rely on individual voters to actually 
look at their receipt, or even for a volunteer election official to ensure each 
voter confirms their receipt.  While VVPTs certainly diminish fear, they fail to 
provide complete transparency.  Unless guided by electoral requirements or 
state statutes, the need to actually compare paper audits with the voting 
system’s record is compelling evidence of corrupted software.  If the software 
within an electronic voting system is, for example, “flipping votes,” how can 
voters place complete trust in the VVPT feature if the software has been 
demonstrated to be corrupted?196  
While these policies do assist in reassuring the public in the integrity of the 
electoral system, they do little more than divert public attention from the real 
problem: the auditing of the software.  Thus, broadening the scope of auditing 
paper ballots and proposals to implement them further do little more than 
facilitate an unverifiable electoral system that promotes convenience over 
reliability. 
C.  THE LITIGANT’S SOLUTION: BURDEN SHIFTING  
Past attempts at remedying the problems inherent with electronic voting 
systems have been met without success.  The aforementioned remedies focus 
on legislation, ranging from the creation of a new commission to the complete 
nullification of government trade secrets.  Yet, scholars and political 
commentators have failed to recognize an additional avenue for expanding 
access to the software within the machines: the practice of burden shifting.  In 
legal issues revolving around compliance with Environmental and 
Administrative laws, burden shifting is commonly practiced.  
Typically, a party bringing litigation has the burden of production and 
persuasion to produce evidence supporting its claim.  In McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
v. Green, the Supreme Court deviated from that norm and created the burden-
shifting framework which governs in employment discrimination claims.197  In 
reaching its conclusion, the Court noted that it was the “purpose of Congress to 
assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those 
discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job 
                                                                                                                   
 196 Reddix-Smalls, supra note 55, at 704.  
 197 Adam Kielich, The McDonnell Douglas Burden Shifting Framework, THE KIELICH LAW FIRM, 
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environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens.”198  Similar to electronic 
voting system cases where the plaintiff is unable to survive a motion for 
summary judgment because of the lack of knowledge of particularized evidence 
as a result of trade secret protection, many employment discrimination claims 
likewise fail to make it to trial.199  Rather than force the party bringing the claim 
to engage in extensive and time-consuming discovery to find evidence to 
support their claim, the burden-shifting framework “shifts the burden to the 
employer to produce a nondiscriminatory reason. . . . [before] it shifts the 
burden back to the employee-plaintiff to disprove the alleged nondiscriminatory 
reason for the employer’s conduct.”200 
The McDonnell Douglas framework requires three prongs be met:  
(1) The plaintiff must plead and prove a prima facie case of 
discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence; (2) The 
burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory motive for its conduct; [and] (3) 
The burden of production shifts back to the employee to prove 
the employer’s provided motive is pretext for discriminatory 
conduct.201 
Usually, the plaintiff bringing the action belongs to a protected group, and the 
framework is typically utilized in cases where the plaintiff’s assertions are based 
on circumstantial evidence.202  
Burden shifting has likewise been a mechanism used to lower the evidentiary 
burden inherent in cases involving environmental law.  Plaintiffs struggled to 
overcome significant evidentiary burdens in order to maintain a claim, such as 
proving, for example, that a pollutant injured not only the individual bringing 
the claim but also the wider public in general.203  This problem was exacerbated 
by the lack of uniform federal standards for regulating pollution and thus a 
heavy burden on parties seeking to protect the environment.204  States were 
likewise unwilling to impose additional environmental protections in fear that 
their state would suffer consequences from big businesses which opposed 
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reform.205  Furthermore, in each different locality, variable environmental laws 
were in effect; therefore, activists had to begin anew when seeking 
environmental protections in different places.206  With increased public focus 
on environmental concerns, Congress finally began to pass legislation 
addressing critical environmental concerns, reasoning that “private litigation 
would not solve pollution problems [and] that state efforts were inadequate.”207  
This should sound familiar.  
To diminish the public’s involuntary contact with harmful toxins and 
pollutants, California passed the “Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement 
Act of 1986,” shifting the burden to manufacturers and businesses to give 
“clear and reasonable warning” to anyone exposed to known cancerous or toxic 
chemicals.208  California delegated the regulation of those warnings to its Office 
of Environmental Health and Hazard Assessment which established thresholds 
to determine the significance of risk standards.209  Thus, the burden rests on 
these manufacturers to provide adequate data demonstrating their compliance 
with those standards.210 
California has utilized burden-shifting in other toxic tort contexts.211  The 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) did not expressly provide for a burden-shifting mechanism, but 
courts have interpreted the law in that manner.212  Once the plaintiff establishes 
that a defendant is a person falling within the ambit of liability in the Act, the 
defendant bears the complete “burden of disproving that its actions resulted in 
a release of hazardous substances.”213  
Burden-shifting wouldn’t completely vitiate an electronic voting system 
manufacturer’s trade secret—it would solely entail releasing enough 
information, protected by the safety of an in camera inspection, to alleviate any 
concern of specific malfunctioning with these machines.  Likewise, because all 
machines are built with the same optics and presumably receive the same 
software updates, manufacturers would be incentivized to keep detail data logs 
of software patches and ensure uniform compliance with those standards.  
Burden-shifting would provide the best opportunity for ensuring the accuracy 
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of an election while simultaneously minimizing the trade secret infringement 
upon a manufacture—an infringement which should be encouraged in light of 
these manufacturers profiting on our democratic process.  
D.  THE 2016 RECOUNT: VOTING SYSTEMS AND ELECTION INTEGRITY 
As evidenced by Stein’s 2016 recount efforts and previously discussed 
voting system issues beginning in the early 2000’s, most electoral cases of fraud 
and other computer irregularities are filed under state election laws rather than 
under federal statute.214  These suits are often filed by losing candidates and 
seek recounts or new elections.215 
While many different events leading to litigation over electronic voting 
systems were introduced earlier in this Note, perhaps the best example of a 
standard which could be utilized lies in Ohio common law.  In November 1990, 
a tightly contested race in the state’s attorney general race was determined by 
“less than one-quarter of one percent.”216  The losing candidate filed suit, 
alleging that the optical scanning machines in one county were poorly 
maintained and “in such [a state of] disrepair.”217  Furthermore, these machines 
were alleged to have recorded more votes than were actually recorded in the 
poll books.218 
Determining it was bound by stringent Ohio precedent, the court required 
the losing candidate to prove two facts: “(1) that one or more election 
irregularities occurred, and (2) that the irregularity or irregularities affected 
enough votes to change or make uncertain the result of the election” by clear 
and convincing evidence.219  The court determined that the losing candidate’s 
conclusory allegations that several optical scanning machines either failed to 
record a vote or the machine’s outright rejection failed to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence “that an irregularity occurred.”220  However, the losing 
candidate was successful in proving a discrepancy of the poll books as an 
irregularity by clear and convincing evidence, but he nonetheless failed to prove 
the second prong.221  Consequently, the court determined the irregularity did 
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not directly influence the outcome of the election, and the losing candidate was 
left without a remedy.222  
More recent efforts have met similar ends.  While Stein eventually failed in 
her attempts for a recount in Pennsylvania, United States District Court Judge 
Diamond delivered a detailed thirty-one-page opinion outlining his reason for 
denying Stein’s motion.223  Stein alleged that, while the electronic voting systems 
identified Donald Trump as the winner, he failed to receive a majority vote 
from Pennsylvania citizens.224  Seeking to review, among other requests, the 
electronic voting systems in six different counties, Stein presented an expert 
witness and four affidavits from experts exhibiting the vulnerability of these 
electronic voting systems.225  Denying the motion, Judge Diamond labeled 
Stein’s claims as outrageous and unnecessary.226  
Stein’s suit in Michigan met a similar fate. In the initial suit, Dr. Stein sought 
a preliminary injunction for certification of Michigan’s results in order to 
conduct a recount.227  Granting the request, Judge Goldsmith recognized the 
likelihood of irreparable harm voters in Pennsylvania could experience if results 
were not completely accurate, noting that a fair and accurate vote is the 
“bedrock of our nation.”228  Judge Goldsmith later dissolved the injunction, 
rejecting Dr. Stein’s allegations of vulnerable electronic voting machines in 
Pennsylvania.229  Stein, according to Judge GoldSmith, had not presented 
“evidence of tampering or mistake” but rather asserted speculative allegations 
about the “mere potentiality” of an unfairly conducted vote.230  
E.  PROPOSING A BURDEN-SHIFTING STANDARD  
The standard cited by the Ohio Supreme Court, while not primarily utilized 
as a burden-shifting statute, provides a practical and easily applicable standard 
for use in electronic voting system litigation.  This Note will evaluate three 
elements critical to the burden shifting analysis. 
1.  Occurrence of Irregularities.  As both Judge Goldsmith and Judge Diamond 
exhibited in their recent decisions to deny Dr. Stein’s recount efforts, specific 
evidence of corrupted or malfunctioning software is required to maintain a 
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claim.231  While specific evidence of wrongdoing ensures that voting system 
manufacturers do not spend the entirety of their time in Court, the evidentiary 
burdens experienced by litigants in conjunction with the trade secret laws which 
protect these manufacturers essentially ensure that these manufacturers remain 
unaccountable to public voters.  
In light of the legal restrictions imposed by both state and federal trade 
secret law, courts should utilize a more pragmatic approach and recognize that 
plaintiffs will often cite specific errors with the software in the machine.  Yet 
mere inability to initially observe the software to determine the true nature of 
the problem should not diminish the public importance of a definitive 
understanding of the legitimacy of an election.  Specific circumstances can show 
a court by clear and convincing evidence that irregularities occurred in these 
voting systems.  
As previously discussed, substantial occurrences of “undervoting” and 
“overvoting” at specific polling precincts provide a significant lapse in trust 
with the voting systems.  While voting is anonymous, it surely may be presumed 
that, for example, 18,000 voters would cast a vote in the race for a 
congressional seat.232  The results exhibit a potential devastating issue with the 
counting mechanisms, and it is difficult to conceive a rational argument for a 
different source of the problem. 
Furthermore, verifiable instances of actual machine malfunctioning should 
give cause for courts to probe further for information on the operation of 
affected voting systems.  Lawyers may litigate the facts and repeated occurrence 
of electronic voting system malfunctioning by, for example, showing that 
“flipping” votes unquestionably increases the likelihood of machine error. 
Unconceivably, in both the 2012 and 2016 presidential election, despite 
substantial media scrutiny on the errors of these voting systems, the significance 
of these events have gone unnoticed (or likely ignored) by Congress, state 
legislatures, and courts.233 
2.  Effect on the Outcome of the Election.  Perhaps a fear of opponents to trade 
secret reform or the utilization of burden-shifting fear that increased access to 
the courts and the potential flood of litigation should deter a remedy that, while 
better guaranteeing accurate electoral results, would make the voting process 
much more bureaucratic.  But a key idea of a true democracy should not be 
solely concerned with efficiency.  Elections are important enough to subvert the 
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inconvenience and potential costs associated with increased access as a result of 
burden-shifting.  
Thus, upon a plaintiff proving the irregularities by clear and convincing 
evidence, the burden should switch to the defendant manufacturer(s) to provide 
tangible evidence that these machines (i) did not malfunction or (ii) did 
malfunction but did not affect the outcome of the election.  Despite appearing 
daunting and ground-shaking, manufacturers can easily comply with the 
obligation.  Keep in mind that the major companies belong to an association 
which promulgates guidelines and conducts independent, yet confidential, 
testing.234  By compiling data on certification for the current year for the alleged 
malfunctioning machine, defendant manufacturers can easily controvert 
allegations by presenting this data to a court without revealing any proprietary 
software which could potentially forfeit their economic benefits.235  
Consequently, the ability to absolve liability with data from the independent 
testing would actually ensure proper certification procedures are followed.236  
3.  Public Policy.  When courts interpret trade secret privilege, such as Florida’s 
trade secret privilege in Buchanan,237 courts often emphasize the significance of the 
economic benefits from proprietary software and the potential harm a 
manufacturer could endure by complying with court orders.  Voting is 
undoubtedly a fundamental right, and typically, when a fundamental right is 
threatened, Courts have applied strict scrutiny to determine whether the State has 
a narrowly tailored, compelling interest in the practice that is being challenged.  
Why has such exacting scrutiny not been applied in these cases to at least fashion 
a workable, adequate remedy which meets the needs of both parties?  
The current unreliable and unchecked voting systems utilized in elections 
represent the potential for a substantial, pervasive threat to the fundamental 
right of voting.  While these manufacturers are protected and enriched through 
free elections, voters remain unaware of the legitimacy and credibility of an 
electoral outcome.  If voting truly is a fundamental right and the bedrock of our 
democracy, protection of the substance must be perceived just as vital as the 
ability. 
Environmental law activists experienced nearly the same problems 
proponents of voting system reform experience: lack of uniform federal 
standards, variable treatment among states, and evidentiary concerns.238  
However, a variation of burden-shifting was utilized to ensure that consumers 
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were made aware of the cancerous and toxic materials within certain 
products.239  But warnings, in the context of electronic voting systems, have 
been demonstrated to fail to reach the public, and frankly, in a system where the 
only accountability these manufacturers have are to each other, voters deserve 
more transparency.240 
IV.  CONCLUSION  
Election errors are not novel issues.  However, a prerequisite to a 
democratic republic requires free, uninhibited elections.  The current electoral 
climate conditions our ability to vote on an ignorance of the actual accuracy of 
the instruments utilized to record that vote.  Thus, while our ability to vote may 
be fundamental and unequivocal, the substance of our vote—our specific 
exercise of endorsement for a certain direction for this country—remains 
inaccurate and consequently unreliable.  
The unreliability of the electronic voting systems has been exacerbated by 
the near-uniform adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, limiting 
claimants’ ability to have their experts observe the machines because of the 
economic benefit derived from the substantially confined knowledge of its 
proprietary information.  
Thus, plaintiffs have failed, ranging from the 1990 Ohio attorney general 
contest to the infamous Bush-Gore Florida debacle to Dr. Jill Stein’s recount 
efforts, to maintain a successful claim in holding voting system manufacturers 
accountable.  Requirements that plaintiffs plead specific evidence in support of 
their allegations relegates many complaints to Judge Diamond’s and Judge 
Goldsmith’s characterization as speculative, conclusory, and ridiculous allegations.  
While previous attempts at remedying the problem, such as vitiating trade 
secrets, utilization of paper audits, federally created commissions, and 
independent reviews, have proven inadequate, a remedy to a problem 
exacerbated by legislatures requires judicial activism; specifically, the application 
of burden-shifting.  
While seemingly an extraordinary standard, burden-shifting has been utilized 
in environmental law and administrative law.  In environmental law specifically, 
activists experienced many of the same problems that proponents of increased 
regulation of electronic voting systems face today: variable standards and the 
lack of a ruling body.  Concededly, the legislature in California initiated burden-
shifting, but unlike much of the natural conflicts facilitating the laws in 
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California, electronic voting systems are aging, developing critical flaws which 
continue to surface prominently in each subsequent election.  Despite the 
increased media attention and academic scrutiny of these machines, legislatures 
have refused to address the problem, and if they have, the perceived, ideal 
remedies have been (1) to strengthen trade secret laws and (2) implement 
meaningless paper audits. 
Redefining the regulation of electronic voting systems requires the 
intervention of the judiciary.  Irregularities exist in these voting systems, but the 
utilization of burden-shifting will renew faith in the electoral system by 
identifying those errors while simultaneously continuing to protect the 
proprietary information of these systems.  Transparency does not require full 
disclosure and inventory of each widget and mechanism within these systems, 
but rather it requires tangible data and statistics describing the operation of 
these machines.  For as long as the substance of a vote remains conditional on 
the pure ability of private electronic system manufacturers to make a substantial 
profit on free elections, the ability to cast one is meaningless.  
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